In the context of hardware and software systems, formal verification is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics.
How can these be formal verification if there is no formal description of the model?
A static analyser will generate control/data flow of a piece of code, upon which formal methods can then be applied to verify conformance to the system's/unit's expected design model.
Note that modelling/formal-specification is NOT a part of static-analysis.
However combined together, both of these tools are useful in formal verification.
For example if a system is modeled as a Finite State Machine (FSM) with
- a pre-defined number of states
defined by a combination of specific values of certain member data.
- a pre-defined set of transitions between various states
defined by the list of member functions.
Then the results of static analysis will help in formal verification of the fact that
the control NEVER flows along a path that is NOT present in the above FSM model.
Also, if a model can be simply defined in terms of type-definition, data-flow, control-flow/call-graph, i.e. code-metrics that a static-analyser can verify, then static-analysis itself is sufficient to formally verify that code conforms to such a model.

NOTE1. The yellow region above would be static analysers used to enforce stuff like coding-guidelines and naming-conventions i.e. aspects of code that cannot affect the program's behavior.
NOTE2. The red region above would be formal verification that requires additional steps like 100% dynamic code-coverage, elimination of unused and dead code. These cannot be detected/enforced using a static-analyser.
Static analysis is highly effective in verifying that a system/unit is implemented using a subset of the language specification to meet goals laid out in the system/unit design.
For example, if it is a design goal to prevent the stack memory from exceeding a particular limit, then one could apply a limit on the depth of recursion (or forbid recursive functions calls altogether). Static-analysis is used to identify such violations of design goals.
In the absence of any warnings from the static-analyser,
the system/unit code stands formally verified against such design-goals of its respective model.
eg. MISRA-C standard for Automotive software defines a subset of C for use in automotive systems.
MISRA-C:2012 contains
143 rules - each of which is checkable using static program analysis.
16 "directives" more open to interpretation, or relate to process.