One modern Linux security hardening tactic is to compile & link code with the option -Wl,-z-noexecstack
, this marks the DLL or binary as not needing an executable stack. This condition can be checked using readelf
or other means.
I have been working with uClibc and noticed that it produces objects (.so files) that do not have this flag set. Yet uClibc has a configuration option UCLIBC_BUILD_NOEXECSTACK
which according to the help means:
Mark all assembler files as noexecstack, which will mark uClibc
as not requiring an executable stack. (This doesn't prevent other
files you link against from claiming to need an executable stack, it
just won't cause uClibc to request it unnecessarily.)
This is a security thing to make buffer overflows harder to exploit.
...etc...
On some digging into the Makefiles this is correct - the flag is only applied to the assembler.
Because the flag is only passed to the assembler does this mean that the uClibc devs have missed an important hardening flag? There are other options, for example UCLIBC_BUILD_RELRO
which do result in the equivalent flag being added to the linker (as -Wl,-z,relro
)
However a casual observer could easily misread this and assume, as I originally did, that UCLIBC_BUILD_NOEXECSTACK
is actually marking the .so file when it is in fact not. OpenWRT for example ensures that that flag is set when it builds uClibc.
Why would uClibc not do things the 'usual' way? What am I missing here? Are the libraries (e.g. librt.so, libpthread.so, etc) actually not NX?
EDIT
I was able to play with the Makefiles and get the noexecstack bit by using the -Wl,-z,noexecstack
argument. So why would they not use that as well?