Attacking and disabling an entire country's internet system is not that hard. You don't need sophisticated equipment or even a computer to do it.
An elderly Georgian woman was
scavenging for copper to sell as scrap
when she accidentally sliced through
an underground cable and cut off
internet services to all of
neighbouring Armenia, it emerged on
Wednesday.
The woman, 75, had been digging for
the metal not far from the capital
Tbilisi when her spade damaged the
fibre-optic cable on 28 March [2010].
(The news broke today, how could I ignore it?)
More seriously, there are examples of real cyber attacks on level of national conflicts. Perhaps the best documented and most sophisticated is the Stuxnet worm, which was apparently engineered to find its way into facilities associated with the Iranian nuclear program. Wired magazine writes:
The Stuxnet worm was discovered in
June in Iran, and has infected more
than 100,000 computer systems
worldwide. At first blush, it appeared
to be a standard, if unusually
sophisticated, Windows virus designed
to steal data, but experts quickly
determined it contained targeted code
designed to attack Siemens Simatic
WinCC SCADA systems. SCADA systems,
short for “supervisory control and
data acquisition,” are control systems
that manage pipelines, nuclear plants
and various utility and manufacturing
equipment.
Researchers determined that Stuxnet
was designed to intercept commands
sent from the SCADA system to control
a certain function at a facility, but
until Symantec’s latest research, it
was not known what function was being
targeted for sabotage. Symantec still
has not determined what specific
facility or type of facility Stuxnet
targeted, but the new information
lends weight to speculation that
Stuxnet was targeting the Bushehr or
Natanz nuclear facilities in Iran as a
means to sabotage Iran’s nascent
nuclear program.
According to Symantec, Stuxnet targets
specific frequency-converter drives —
power supplies used to control the
speed of a device, such as a motor.
The malware intercepts commands sent
to the drives from the Siemens SCADA
software, and replaces them with
malicious commands to control the
speed of a device, varying it wildly,
but intermittently.
The malware, however, doesn’t sabotage
just any frequency converter. It
inventories a plant’s network and only
springs to life if the plant has at
least 33 frequency converter drives
made by Fararo Paya in Teheran, Iran,
or by the Finland-based Vacon.
Even more specifically, Stuxnet
targets only frequency drives from
these two companies that are running
at high speeds — between 807 Hz and
1210 Hz. Such high speeds are used
only for select applications. Symantec
is careful not to say definitively
that Stuxnet was targeting a nuclear
facility, but notes that “frequency
converter drives that output over 600
Hz are regulated for export in the
United States by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission as they can be
used for uranium enrichment.”
While the exact author of Stuxnet may not be known, it's tough to imagine any reason a non-nation state actor would engineer such a thing. Therefore, it probably should be considered a cyber war attack.
So will countries ever really declare war over these kinds of attacks? I'm not sure. Cyber attacks are very hard to trace. It's not like planes and tanks emblazoned with flags are rolling over borders. Instead, we're talking about pieces of code that spread themselves to hundreds of thousands of computers - and on most of them, doing nothing. It could be a really interesting field of international law, once one of these attacks actually kills people or otherwise compromises some nation's security.