As mentioned in the previous answer - full disk encryption protects mainly from an actor physically stealing the hardware and trying to gain access at a later point. So as soon as the VM/hardware is shut down - your data is inaccessible unless decrypted.
In the case of an automatic decryption on boot, it is even more pointless unless you somehow separate the decryption process from the hardware i.e. your vps gets a decryption key from another machine that would give it only in a safe state(let's say only if the request comes from the VPS with that IP, etc.).
So, to your case, your VPS sits in a data center, normally turned on and decrypted. There are several vectors malicious staff in your hosting provider can use:
- Almost all vps hosts provide a direct way to get a shell and dump the fs locally or via vnc. That would be easiest and most of the time you can't circumvent that from within the VPS.
- Your key ends up in the RAM of the host, so a memory dump would certainly reveal it.
- If a vps snapshot is taken including memory - now your key is in the snapshot in plain text.
On a more positive note, a larger vps provider hosts dozens if not hundreds of vm's on a single piece of hardware, in a data center with hundreds, if not thousands, if not tens of thousands(aws, azure, etc) of servers. What are the chances of someone being interested in your vps exactly? Mind that in companies with good security policies playing around with the servers and vps's produces a pretty heavy audit log trail, so it has to be worth the risk. And if it's worth the risk and your data is so extremely valuable and security is so paramount, then it might be worth hosting it yourself.